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A Fistful of Dollars: Hedge Funds, Private
Equity and Bankruptcy1
Marti Kopacz, Jeff Marwil, Sandra Mayerson, and Bradley Sharp
MS. MAYERSON: Hi. We're going to be talking this afternoon
about hedge funds and private equity in bankruptcy, and we're going
to cover what hedge funds and private equity investors are: histori-
cally, how far they've invested in bankruptcy, and how this has im-
pacted reorganization.
Then, we're going to take our crystal balls and try to talk about how
that might change, given the current economic climate, and how that
will impact on the ability to reorganize.
The term "hedge fund", which is used in the materials, is a term that
people throw around pretty loosely, and I thought maybe we would
start by talking a little bit about what is a hedge fund. So Marti, can
you tell us what a hedge fund is, and what makes it different from
private equity?
MS. KOPACZ: I'll give it a shot, and we'll get the mic up here and
we'll do that. Hedge funds have been around since the '40's, much
like private equity has been around since the '40's. We think there are
about 9,000 hedge funds today with - and how many have closed and
how many are going out of business, we'll know in another year when
we take a look at it. But those 9,000 hedge funds that we can identify
had $1.7 trillion invested when they were formed. So again, it's a con-
jecture as to what still sits in a hedge fund today, significantly less than
$1.7 trillion. But regardless, it's still a lot of money.
Hedge funds are a vehicle for investments by institutions and
wealthy individuals. You really can't invest in a hedge fund in incre-
ments less than, you know, very high six figures or seven figures. They
are limited; each fund is limited to one hundred different individuals,
and they're very lightly regulated. We think that may change under
the current administration and the current sorts of circumstances, but
they still are very lightly regulated. Hedge funds came about to allow
for aggressive investment strategies, and I think when you think about
1. This is an edited version of the transcript from the second panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Into the Sunset: Bankruptcy as Scriptwriter of
the Denouement of Financial Distress, held on April 16, 2009.
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the term "hedge," hedge means safe, or at least balanced, you know,
on both sides. That's the whole point of a hedge. Well, hedge funds
today, and for most of their existence, have oftentimes not been par-
ticularly safe and, in fact, have been highly risky sorts of investment
strategies. Hedge funds have characteristics as to what it is in which
they are investing. Most hedge funds invest in public types of securi-
ties, bank debts, bonds, those sorts of things, things that could be eas-
ily traded in and out. Some of them may have a profile around where
they invest. They may invest in some sort of a global strategy or a
country or region strategy, or they may invest in a specific industry or
they may avoid a specific industry. They may have a certain time hori-
zon. So there's not a - there's no set definition, there's no single view
that I can give you of what a hedge fund is. It is a - it's a loosely
regulated pool of money from wealthy individuals and institutions to
which management of those funds can apply very aggressive strate-
gies. You'll often hear in the context of hedge funds something called
the two and twenty formula. That's how hedge fund managers get
paid. The two percent is the fee that they get paid as a part of the
committed capital. So again, that can be a lot of money on $1.7 tril-
lion. And the twenty percent is twenty percent of the profits of the
fund. You can begin to get an appreciation why, you know, young,
smart fresh-faced M.B.A.s wanted to go into the hedge fund business
over the last number of years. There was a lot of money to be made
and a lot of personal income that they can garner in their role as mas-
ters of the universe.
AUDIENCE: And taxed at the capital gains rate.
MS. KOPACZ: And taxed at the capital gains rate. Compare and
contrast that with private equity. Private equity came to be after
World War II and, you know, contrast that a little bit with hedge
funds. Private equity is a lot more about what its name is, in the sense
that the investments are in private companies and the investments are
intended to be more permanent capital. So they're intended to be at
the equity level, or definitely at a subordinated level, to the bank
debtor, more secured debt in an organization. The time frame is very,
very long in some of these - in some these funds. It can be, you
know, seven, eight, ten, twelve years. It's very illiquid as compared to
a hedge fund investment. We think there are about 2,700 private eq-
uity firms today with about $1.3 trillion invested, at least at the outset.
Again, what that's worth today, don't really know, but it's - it's
clearly a lot of money that has gone into private equity.
Private equity funds tend to have a personality to them in the sense
of the way they like to invest. Maybe they're an LBO shop, and they
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like to do leverage buyouts and that's what they did, or they were
venture capital or they were growth capital oriented, but they tended
to have a profile around what they wanted to invest in and really stay
more tightly focused than what you would see in a hedge fund. Their
fees again are a percentage of the capital that is committed. So when
you hear somebody say, "Oh, I've just raised a $500 million fund,"
well, what that means is, for the most part, they've got promises from
investors to give them $500 million if they come to them with invest-
ments that they want to make. So, private equity doesn't get paid
until they actually commit the capital and put it to work, whereas
hedge funds will raise the pot of money, take their fees and then de-
ploy it.
The similarities are that they're both lightly regulated. They're both
private pools of capital. And their compensation ultimately depends
on the profitability. The biggest difference, and this will be more rele-
vant when we talk about how they behave in a restructuring context, is
that hedge funds are willing to accept limited knowledge in return for
favorable pricing, whereas a private equity firm will seek deeper
knowledge and will be willing to pay more for more certainty in their
investment decisions. So in your materials, pages 16 and 17 have com-
parison charts between them on a whole variety of components, some
of which I've mentioned, but there's a lot more in your materials on
the compare and contrast.
MS. MAYERSON: If you're an investor, how do you get out of a
hedge funds or a private equity fund? Is it the same for both?
MS. KOPACZ: A private equity fund will have a stated term when
you go into it. You used to be able to get out of a hedge fund. I don't
know that you can get out now.
MR. SHARP: You can get out, but they have a catch.
MR. MARWIL: The documents provide for redemptions on a
quarterly basis. But hedge fund managers reserve the right in their
documents to suspend redemptions, and many of the hedge funds
now, given the current market climate, have, in fact, suspended the
redemptions, and it's typically a permanent suspension until the hedge
fund managers prepare to start making distributions from the fund,
presumably as the fund is liquidating. So, at least in the setup, the
difference was that hedge fund investors could get out on a moment's
notice quarterly. Private equity investors, on the other hand, were
stuck for the entire term of the partnership, typically five to seven
years.
And that, the psychology of managing those two funds, is very dif-
ferent as a result of the demands that investors place on hedge fund
2009] 599
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managers for constant high returns, whereas the private equity man-
ager has the entire term of the partnership in order to accomplish the
return goals. So the behavior of the two funds in investments differs
at least in part because of how the investors are entitled to be paid.
MS. MAYERSON: I think with the recent rash of redemptions, the
run of everyone to redeem, a lot of the hedge funds are very illiquid
right now, whereas the private equity still has the commitments for
capital and has a lot of money to spend. So, I think you're going to be
seeing hedge funds investing less in the distressed space and private
equity investing more in the distressed space.
But speaking of that, Brad, obviously both hedge funds and private
equity have a lot of different investment options, not just distress.
What factors have made them such dominant players in the distressed
marketplace historically?
MR. SHARP: Well, as we kind of discussed earlier, we'll focus first
on a hedge fund and then we'll talk about private equity and the dis-
tressed investing. Hedge funds pursue a more aggressive strategy, and
in a distress situation, it is a terrific opportunity to be very aggressive.
By definition it's a period of high uncertainty. As Marti said, they're
willing to trade knowledge for price. If they get a cheaper price,
they're willing to go in and take a flier, and a distressed situation is
perfectly engineered for that kind of structure.
Private equity is slightly different because they're looking more for
a buy and hold. So they're looking more for the true turnaround to
come in, buy a company in a distressed environment or buy a piece of
some of the debt structure in a distressed environment, expecting that
it will turn around over some period of time. The advantage of buying
into distressed businesses is if the plan works, you're going to get your
return. If the plan doesn't work, then you will end up essentially own-
ing the asset, and if you like the asset, particularly when you're invest-
ing in a distressed business, if you like the underlying concept of the
business, you end up owning it and can take control of it and can turn
it around yourself.
Both entities, probably more the hedge funds than the private eq-
uity, are very flexible in what they're looking for. They're not like a
National Bank, you know, that has to look for particular collateral
advances and rates and fees. Your hedge funds and private equity can
be much more flexible since they're lightly regulated as far as what
they're looking for. Because of the risk/reward scenario in the dis-
tressed environment, they can really buy low because, at least histori-
cally, hedge funds had a lot of cash. They could step into a cash
stressed environment, be the white knight, buy very cheap, turn the
[Vol. 7:597
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thing around and then make a lot of money, and that worked very
well for them for a long period of time.
Now, the issue is not the "why's," it's the "how's." And I've seen
hedge funds and private equity in a distressed environment do every-
thing from making a direct loan to the entity, buying a piece of a se-
cured debt, make a direct mezzanine loan to the company or buying a
piece of a mezzanine or making equity investments or buying equity.
So they can be pretty much in any piece of the capital structure, and
here's the scary part, they could be in all of the pieces of the capital
structure. They could have a piece of the secured debt. They could
have a piece of the mezzanine debt. They could have a piece of the
equity. And how that particular deal works out depends upon which
one of their pieces they're going to make their money on.
As we will talk about a little later, that can kind of have an impact
on their behavior, depending upon which piece of the capital structure
they see is currently in the money, and if they take a different action,
whether that is going to bring one piece into the money or the other
piece out of the money and which way to work that. It's kind of a
Rubik's Cube of return, whichever way they can get the colors to all
line up. The big difference that I've seen when looking between hedge
funds and the private equity scenarios is exactly what Jeff was talking
about, and that's their timeline. When you're looking at a hedge fund,
they're looking to show their increase in assets every quarter. They
want to be able to show a growth in profits. They want to show their
assets continuing to increase every single quarter because that's how
they're going to be judged, that's how their investors are going to
make a decision: do I get out or stay in? That's going to lead to cer-
tain types of investments and a certain type of management of that
investment in the process.
The private equity, once they're in, they're probably going to stay
until that particular asset either gets sold or moves on. They're not as
concerned with showing the quarterly numbers. So they're a little less
concerned about how it shows on their balance sheet, whereas a hedge
funds is very concerned with what values show on the hedge fund's
reporting to the investors. That's pretty much the how's and the why's
on investing in distressed markets.
MR. MARWIL: You know, I think the hedge fund investor, at least
in the corporate space - I mean, hedge funds invest in all kinds of
liquid securities and now the illiquid securities, the derivatives and the
mortgages and CLOs and such. But the hedge funds that are investing
in the middle market corporate America private companies - and
there are a host of funds that make those investments in both the eq-
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uity side as well as the debt side, they are of a different mindset, typi-
cally in the lending groups that they buy into, and they typically are
not going to hold an entire position within a company that-an entire
debt position. They're only going to be one of the many lenders at a
particular level. And they do get fairly active with those groups. And
they have a different mindset and a different agenda than the typical
lender or a CLO lender, for instance, in a particular tranche of debt.
You know, from the company's perspective, it's really important to
know who your lenders are. It then becomes important to know what
kind of hedge fund and what condition the hedge fund is in, in order
to judge how that hedge fund is going to react to the restructuring
initiatives of the company.
MS. MAYERSON: Picking up on what Jeff said about the different
agenda of hedge funds, I think it's very important to recognize that
their investment goals are different from traditional lenders, and that
this has caused some issues for bankruptcy professionals who were
used to dealing with institutional lenders. Brad, how do you think that
the investment goals of hedge funds have affected reorganization in
general, talking about historically?
MR. SHARP: Well, you know, historically, when you were working
for a debtor in a restructuring environment, you were dealing with
your secured lenders, who used to be all banks, and you knew how the
banks were going to react as you dealt with the situation. If you
showed them that you had good numbers, you could turn it around,
the collateral position wouldn't deteriorate, you could pretty much
count on what direction they were going to head because they didn't
want to take a loan loss, they didn't want to increase their exposure,
but they also weren't all that interested in foreclosing and shooting
you in the head if they didn't have to.
Hedge funds are very different because it depends on what their
strategy is and what their view is of the company. They may want to
foreclose. This may be a loan to own where they made the loan as a
secured creditor hoping and expecting that the company would de-
fault, that they'd be able to foreclose and take the assets of the com-
pany, and instead of having a debt return, they now have an equity
return. So their motivation and your negotiations with them as a
lender are going to be very different because they want you to default.
They want you to blow covenants, and they want to foreclose as
quickly as possible once you do so. And that is entirely different than
how you'll deal with a major bank, or how you used to deal with a
major bank.
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The complexity in this is you could start your conversation with a
bank, at least historically, and the bank was working how normal
banks would. And then partway through the process, some hedge
fund offered them a serious chunk of change for their secured loan,
and now the bank is gone, and now you're dealing with a hedge fund.
That changes the dynamics significantly. And, as Jeff said, the hedge
fund is not necessarily the entire tranche of the debt structure.
They're not all of your secured debt. Maybe they bought a piece of
participation of one of the lenders. So now you have a fifteen mem-
ber bank group that consists of fourteen banks and one hedge fund,
and that hedge fund is going to make as much noise and as much
difficulty as possible until somebody pays them out or they get what
they want. So that's going to very much drive their strategy, and you
can take that same analysis and put it into a mezzanine debt or put it
into an equity position. You know, they're looking at, every quarter,
what is their return, and given their position, what is the best way for
them to maximize that return. And they're going to be taking - mak-
ing decisions based on their own internal analysis. They're not going
to be looking at it like other credit providers who will say, "Where is
this company going to be in six months, twelve months, two years
from now?" They're going to be looking at what they can report for
earnings next quarter.
MR. MARWIL: There's another dynamic that also plays itself out
and has for a while. Hedge funds trade in and out of positions in
securities all the time. And they may not be a long-term player. And
if their strategy is to be a long-term player, sometimes they'll buy in
and they'll buy debt at a discount, and if the debt is performing, mean-
ing that interest and principal are being paid, if it buys in at a discount,
it's buying at a much higher interest rate performance-wise than that
at which the debt was originally issued. And sometimes the hedge
funds are looking for that kind of return. And although they'll take
the position Brad's talking about in terms of really pushing either to
get control of the company through a debt for equity swap or maybe
buying up other positions in the debt structure to have that increased
return on interest, they'll be okay hanging out for a little while, and
sometimes their agenda isn't exactly what it seems.
Sometimes they'll play out the agenda that Brad is talking about,
but what they're really looking to do is to create fatigue with some of
the bank lenders, get the bank lenders to sell at an even deeper dis-
count and have an even bigger slice of the performing debt for a pe-
riod of time, and then ultimately exact the strategy to which Brad is
referring.
2009]
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MR. SHARP: To that point, I mean you are kind of in an awkward
position as the debtor because your hedge fund may own some of the
junior debt. They want this thing to go as poorly as possible because
then the senior lenders are going to set out as cheaply as possible, and
they can pick up that position, and now suddenly everything is much
better than it used to be. You know, when you have a player that's
playing it at each different strata of the debt structure, their strategy
will change or they'll show one strategy and it means something en-
tirely different.
MS. KOPACZ: Only to Jeff, who is their attorney, will they tell you
what they intend to do.
MR. MARWIL: They won't even tell me.
MS. KOPACZ: So when you're advising the company - and un-
derstand, you know, Brad and I are on the financial side and Sandy
and Jeff are on the legal side, and they've got some privilege, so you
can keep secrets, right?
MS. MAYERSON: Have to.
MS. KOPACZ: The truth is when you're the company and you're
the "debtor in waiting," as we like to say sometimes, this is not always
evident and it's like peeling an onion and it changes. And one of the
other things we're beginning to see, particularly as we follow investors
who have had concentrations in certain industries, is that they have,
they're basically going through their portfolio and deciding who
they're going to support and who they're not, what they want to do
here and what they don't. And it also has to do with who they've co-
invested with. So talk about a Rubik's Cube. It's at least a three-
dimensional view of how they make their decisions and it's not just
economic, which is very hard for those of us on the financial advisory
side, even the legal side; we think people should be economically
motivated.
MS. MAYERSON: You know, is there a question, Allen?
AUDIENCE: I have a question. In the current environment, in the
Madoff environment that exists versus what you described as the
overall strategy, how do you think this has affected and how do you
think it's changed from a, on the legal side.
MS. MAYERSON: You mean how are hedge funds going to be-
have differently in this environment?
AUDIENCE: How are they going to?
MS. MAYERSON: We're going to get into that after we lay a little
more foundation. So let us get a little further and then if you don't
feel that the question has been answered, we'll come back to you. Is
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that okay? You know, one of the challenges, of course, for bank-
ruptcy professionals given what all the panelists have been saying is,
you know, the debtor's professionals used to have to know their
debtor. Now that almost isn't enough. You have to know your inves-
tor too because unless you can try to parse through some of these
issues that the hedge fund is facing, you're not going to be able to
propose something that's appealing to them. So how do the panelists
feel we should go about - if you're the debtor's professional, how do
you go about figuring out what you need to do to do something ap-
pealing to your investors?
MR. SHARP: Well, let me start and then, you know, I know we'll
segue into this and different pieces of it. Part of it, I think Jeff said
earlier, is know who your hedge fund is and try to find out what you
can about what that hedge fund's strategy is.
MS. MAYERSON: And how do you go about that?
MR. SHARP: Well, the sad part is hedge funds are not a very open
organization. You know, you can try to find out, do as much public
searching as you can about what they're into. You'll talk to a lot of
colleagues in the industry and ask, "Well, this particular hedge fund,
what are they into, what type of investments do they do?" And the
advantage with all of us is we've been doing this long enough that we
see the same hedge funds in different deals, so you can sometimes
intuit what they're looking for in investments. The problem is, espe-
cially now, that's changing, because before, as Jeff said, they'd be per-
fectly happy to get their yield on the debt because they bought at a
discount, it's a current paid, everything's good and then they're happy
to carry that in the future. Now they're getting hit with a whole bunch
of redemptions. Now they're tight for cash. The yield on their inter-
est debt is no longer what they need. They now need cash and need it
fast. So what was a historical strategy is going to change. I think right
now the only way you can intuit where they're headed is what they're
doing. But I wouldn't count on that staying to be what they're doing
for the next sixty days. I think it's very short run. Jeff, do you have
different views of how to predict what they're going to do?
MR. MARWIL: I think the only thing you can really do is look at
their behavior when you're interacting with them, try and talk to
them, and listen through word of mouth. I mean, if there is a hedge
fund out there where its investors are clamoring for redemptions and
not getting them, clamoring for the fund to liquidate, clamoring for a
change in management, if you get out there and network enough ei-
ther in the professional network or just with people who are in the
hedge fund industry, you'll hear about it.
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So I mean it's a little bit of luck and it's a little bit of the needle in a
haystack in terms of finding out exactly what the agenda of the hedge
fund is. And if you can't figure it out, then I think you have to test it a
little bit. There are two ends of the spectrum. First, the healthy end,
which is that the fund is going to pursue its stated goals and it wants to
be in the investment, and it's either a loan-to-loan kind of fund where
you know that by reputation or it wants to hang out and take the
increased yield based on buying at a discount. The opposite side of
that spectrum is when all bets are off in funding cash, and it's going to
do anything and everything it possibly can to agitate for the debtor to
either sell itself, to file bankruptcy and get refinancing or some other
liquidity event to the extent there's something available in the market-
place, and that's uncertain at this point, as well.
MS. MAYERSON: Isn't it also a problem that these strategies,
which, as you're saying, are very short-term right now, can change in
the middle of a case? And the debtor may have been working with
the hedge fund, and the hedge fund either changes its strategy or has
decided it's gotten the return it's looking for and sells its claim, and
you're starting all over again. How is that affecting reorganization?
MR. SHARP: It's obviously making them much more difficult.
And previously, reorganizations were a negotiation: you reach a con-
clusion, the maximized value, you implement it, you move on. Now
the debtor really has to drive the bus and try to make the hedge funds
or other creditors react to what he is doing and try to push it as hard
and as fast as he can, not necessarily depending upon creating a deal
with the other side. That used to be, in the last two years, much easier
than it is now because to have that kind of strategy you need capital.
Unfortunately, there's not a lot of capital out there right now.
MS. KOPACZ: I'll give you a perfect example. I don't know if any-
body here is really involved in the Chrysler situation, but our firm
does a lot of work in the auto space, and I can comment on this be-
cause we're not in the Chrysler situation.
Up until December 31st of last year, the word on the street was that
Servers was pulling all the levers. They were making all the decisions.
They had a flock of people in Chrysler's offices. They were making
decisions on bankruptcy counsel and financial advisors and negotiat-
ing with the banks and they were in - they were driving the bus.
They were completely driving the bus.
December 31st, they left. They haven't been back. They don't an-
swer phone calls. Okay. So right, who is driving the bus?
MR. SHARP: The bus driver took a coffee break.
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MS. KOPACZ: The bus driver took a coffee break, and I don't
think the bus driver's coming back. So that is - that's a very dra-
matic example, but the truth of the matter is, it happens a lot with our
middle-market companies, and that goes to the private equity side as
well where it's a private company, the private equity firm has been
incredibly involved, and all of a sudden, they make a decision and
they're out of the picture. And the management team there is left
with, "My God, I've got to run this company."
MR. MARWIL: It used to be, before the current market condi-
tions, that hedge funds could trade out of anything on a moment's
notice. There was always a market. You could always sell something.
It was just a question of price. And there would be a lot of positioning
in order to attract the best price, but you could get out.
Now they're very illiquid markets. Corporate debt is not really trad-
ing, and if it is, it's trading at fairly significant discounts that may not
even reflect reality. Some of the other positions that are out there
aren't trading either, and part of the reason for lack of trading and the
decreased prices and discounts is that there isn't very much capital out
there chasing deals right now in space.
On the private equity side, however, there's a lot of capital, as
Sandy pointed out, and the private equity players are entering the
marketplace now, not as equity owners and not trying to buy compa-
nies through equity purchases or through LBOs2, but they're getting
into the market by buying debt positions. And what I think we're go-
ing to see going forward is, I think we're going to see some exodus by
the hedge funds that need the liquidity in favor of the private equity
firms that are going to be buying into debt positions with the expecta-
tion that they're going to be able to convert that debt into equity, and
maybe even controlling equity through some additional capital invest-
ment. So I think, and maybe this is a little cynical, but it's definitely
ironic where you're going to have the private equity players that are
going to become the "loan to own" in the marketplace.
MR. SHARP: Do you think, Jeff, that will stabilize the situation or
make it worse?
MR. MARWIL: I don't know that it will make it worse, but I don't
think it's going to stabilize anything. I think it's going to create vola-
tility and uncertainty, and I think the corporate managers and advisors
to these companies need to move quickly, and the decisions about re-
structuring for everybody in the capital structure, people need to
2. Leveraged Buyouts.
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make the decisions. Delay is not anybody's friend, I don't think, right
now.
MS. MAYERSON: Do we have a question? Can you come to the
microphone, please?
AUDIENCE: Good presentation. The question had to do with
short squeezes and driving the market, the zero - you're kind of get-
ting there. You know, where does the runaway stop?
MS. MAYERSON: It hasn't stopped yet.
MR. SHARP: We'll let you know - it's kind of like how the gov-
ernment predicts when we're in a recession, and they wait about a
year and say, we're in a recession. In about a year or two, we'll all tell
you, all right, here is where it stopped.
AUDIENCE: Are you selling futures on that?
MR. SHARP: Before we go on to that, I want to make sure that
we're clear. This is not just in a large corporate environment. This
impacts middle-market companies down to, literally, $25 million in
revenues. This is not just the multi-billion dollar companies, this is not
just Chrysler. Hedge funds are involved in small "mom and pop" $25
million deals. So this is across the board.
MS. MAYERSON: Kathy, did you have a question, and you need
to use the microphone.
AUDIENCE: This is a really basic question, but what did private
equity do over the last few or several years that they have capital to
use in a time when the hedge funds, and so many players in our na-
tional economy, don't seem to have capital? What do they do
differently?
MS. MAYERSON: There are a couple of things. First of all, it has
to do with the structure that Marti talked about of the private equity
funds as opposed to the hedge funds. The hedge funds get all their
money up front. Private equity gets a commitment, so that you com-
mit that you're going to give the money over time, so they haven't
called in all of their commitments, so they still have cash available in
the pipeline.
Second of all, a lot of the - you may want to comment too, but a
lot of the private equity funds that I work with have been sitting back.
They have not even begun to use up their commitments because they
haven't found attractive things to buy into that are going to give them
the return that they want. Or they're finding companies that were so
distressed they didn't really feel there was a good chance to turn them
around, so now they're finding other points in the capital structure
that give them the returns that they're looking for and, you know, the
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companies that are still surviving may be more attractive to them. So
now I think they're thinking about coming in with this committed cap-
ital that they have on hand.
MR. MARWIL: There was also, in the prior business cycle, so
much competition for deals, and there was so much money that was
being made ironically through, investors were taking the money they
were making in the hedge funds and committing it to private equity
funds. The private equity funds were competing with each other, driv-
ing prices up on these companies, and they weren't able to deploy all
of the money, given the kind of competition that was there.
So I think probably less intentional than anything else, there's
money that's still available from the equity raises that went out before
the market downturn.
MR. SHARP: And I think what we're seeing now is that money is
looking - still looking for a place to go. I'm running a home builder
right now, and I get calls everyday from somebody who wants to give
me money. Now there's - the real drawback is they want to give me
very little, and they want a whole lot for it. They want to buy the
assets at $0.10 on the dollar. So if you want to sell assets at $0.10 on
the dollar, there's money out there, a lot of it.
MS. KOPACZ: In your materials - and I remember Fred and I did
this, we looked at private equity funds created specifically for dis-
tressed investing and the billions of dollars that were raised in 2008,
we think something like $30 billion were raised by private equity just
for distressed investing. So again now that $30 billion isn't sitting in a
private equity bank account, but it's committed by somebody who has,
you know, a few hundred million sitting in their bank account. There's
money out there.
MS. MAYERSON: One of the things we haven't touched on yet is,
traditionally, if you were dealing with a bank, a bank would pretty
often give you DIP financing to protect the loan that it has. What is
the difference in the appetite for DIP financing with hedge funds, pri-
vate equity from financial institutions?
MR. MARWIL: I think, first of all, you have to understand that
there has been significant value deterioration across the board for any
of these companies that are going to require DIP financing. And not
only has there been value deterioration, there's also been balance
sheet deterioration. And by that, I mean the following: when the se-
nior loans and the junior capital or the mezzanine loans were made
for these companies, it was during the prior business cycle, which I call
the "free money" cycle. Banks were lending at very reasonable lend-
ing rates, virtually no or no covenants at all, and it literally was free
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money. If you had a problem with your bank, you'd go refinance it
somewhere else, and if you had a problem with them, you'd refinance
it somewhere else. You might even get a cheaper rate and fewer re-
strictions on what you're doing in your business.
All of that has flipped, and not only that, but the productivity of the
business, the profitability of the business, is reduced, as well. So now
you have lenders who are saying, "I'm not going to take as much risk
and I'm not going to lend at eight times EBITDA.3 I'm going to lend
at four or six times EBITDA." And you've got a company whose
EBITDA has been reduced by - pick a percentage, twenty percent,
thirty percent, fifty percent, so what you have is a complete and utter
inability to refinance all of the debt that was made during the free
money period, and you've got a company now that doesn't have any
value beyond its debt in its assets or in its business so it's got no collat-
eral, no additional collateral to pledge, no additional value to pledge,
no additional value to even predict because it's so far behind where it
was when it got that last loan that DIP4 money is not going to be
available from any outside lender.
So the DIP money is going to be available either from the private
equity player or the equity owner that wants to re-up in effect and try
to get rid of all of this excess debt and take the DIP money that it's
putting in and convert that into some kind of equity position coming
out of bankruptcy. Or it's going to have to come from the existing
debt players themselves, and the senior lenders are - were at least in
the last downturn, the typical source to find DIP money. Now I'm not
so sure that's going to be the case given the different kinds of partici-
pants that play in the senior debt tranche. You've got the traditional
banks who theoretically have money but may not have the ability to
commit additional capital to any particular credit. You've got the
CLOs that are playing that have contractual inability to advance any
additional money and have no ability to consent to being primed by
other lenders. Finally, you've got the hedge funds who are playing
who may want to lend or who may not want to lend but are going to
be fairly predatory, as Brad was talking about, in establishing pricing
and establishing terms.
MR. SHARP: And, something new in this particular cycle, what
I'm seeing is you have lenders out there that have the willingness to
lend, but they don't have the financial ability to lend. And I haven't
seen that since, you know, the S&Ls went bust where you have -
3. Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amoritization.
4. Debtor in possession.
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you're dealing with a lender that says, "Quick, cut a deal with me
because tomorrow I'm going to be controlled by the Feds." And that
creates for an interesting dynamic.
MS. MAYERSON: I've heard a lot of bankruptcy judges complain
that they have not had any real Chapter 11s in front of them because
the hedge funds and private equity either shut the company down or
insist on an immediate 363 sale.5 And that, while hedge funds and
private equity being in the space, may be good for liquidity, but it has
not really been good at all for reorganization. Do you think that's a
fair criticism?
MS. KOPACZ: Absolutely. I do. And that's the - and you have
to remember all of us up here are pretty experienced. I'm not going
to say old. Pretty experienced. Okay, this is my fourth restructuring
wave, and I think my colleagues are probably only on their third. But
the truth of the matter is every one of these is different. Every one of
these has been different. And this is the first time we've dealt with
hedge funds and private equity funds in a real bankruptcy setting. I
mean, there were a few guys out there in the last wave, but they were
much more predictable and they stayed inside a sandbox, which they
created for themselves. And the truth of the matter is that private
equity - and I'm doing a lot more with private equity funds than I am
hedge funds right now, private equity guys do not understand bank-
ruptcy. They do not understand reorganization, and all they can think
of is if I'm at the bottom of the barrel now, right, I'm not moving up.
And, as recently as a couple of weeks ago, I had a client tell me, and
this was a middle-market company, it should survive long term, it's got
real issues right now because of the business it's in and the locations
it's in, but the truth of the matter, he says, "If we had put this com-
pany into bankruptcy in February like you told us, we'd be on our way
out now." And we may not make it through this out-of-court restruc-
turing phase.
MS. MAYERSON: We've talked historically about what it's been
like having hedge funds and private equity come into the bankrhptcy
space. So now moving more along to what Allen wanted to hear, the
financial world around hedge funds is changing, and Jeff, do you think
that's going to cause hedge fund strategy to change as to how the
funds invest and how they treat bankruptcy?
MR. MARWIL: Yeah, I think so. And to understand it, you have
to understand a little bit about the dynamics within a hedge fund and
what they're facing themselves. The first dynamic is that they've got
5. 11 USC §363.
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illiquid markets for their investments. And hedge funds like to trade
and rely on liquidity at the end of a quarter in order to pay off inves-
tors that want to get out of their fund, and that requires trading, and
with the illiquid markets, the trading is difficult, if not impossible.
In addition, hedge funds typically lever their investments, meaning
they go into the marketplace and they borrow and they borrow from
lenders or counterparties or both in order to increase their returns
based on what they think will be a profitable trade. The lenders re-
quire collateral or margin to be posted, and when the redemptions
start coming in and the managers are not able to fulfill the redemption
requests, they have the opportunity to drop a gate, if you will, and
that's the terminology that the industry uses, and they'll drop a gate to
prevent any further redemptions. They'll suspend redemptions and
when they suspend redemptions, word gets out to counterparties and
lenders, and the first thing those lenders and counterparties do, which
is their right in a lot of these trades, is to say, "I need additional collat-
eral, I need more margin." That puts a further squeeze on the cash
and on the need to create cash for the managers, so it becomes a little
bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy in that once you drop the gates to sus-
pend redemptions, it's pretty rare that a hedge fund is going to be able
to right itself, lift the gate, give the redemptions out that investors
have asked for, and resume its normal operation.
So I think if you see a fund that has suspended redemptions, you
can expect that it's probably in the process of winding itself down and
it needs to liquidate itself, typically over a fairly long period of time
given the illiquidity in the market and the types of investments that
the fund is making, and that long period of time may be years, not
even months. So you've got that pressure and that spiral, if you will.
And then what you have is, as you are trading out of a certain posi-
tion, and this really pertains more to the hedge funds that trade in
securities and with derivatives than it does the single debt issuance of
a corporation, but if you're trading out of a position and you've got a
decent sized position, as you start trading down, if your counterparty
knows that your margin requirements went up and you suspended re-
demptions, they're going to bid to lower the price. They're not going
to give you necessarily a higher price. They're going to hold out and
give you a lower price. Then you have to sell more of it, and as you're
selling more, the price is dropping. So you have these spirals that are
happening all around these hedge fund managers, and it is killing
value for the investor. The hedge fund managers are reporting net
asset values to their investors every month and as the spiral is down,
each of these different spirals go down, then that asset value of the
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fund is dropping, investors get agitated; the investors are clamoring
for liquidity, clamoring for the fund manager to commence a liquida-
tion of the fund at all costs, no matter what, give us our cash. And
there are other investors who will say, "That's okay, don't kill us on
value, leave the value, maximize the value, but we want transparency.
We want an independent director that we choose and their communi-
cating with us as investors on a regular basis. We want a monitor."
And sometimes the investors will say, "We want you, the management
company, to replace yourself with somebody that we choose who will
manage the liquidation."
So that is kind of the dynamic that is occurring in many of the hedge
funds that are out there. Certainly not in all of them, but in a lot of
them. As these hedge funds get closer and closer to actually liquidat-
ing healthy positions, which most are not there yet, it's going to take a
lot longer for them to get there, but then there will be a whole host of
problems associated with actually closing the funds. So I think that's
the dynamic that you have there, and when you're dealing with an
entity like that in a bankruptcy case, you have no idea how to predict
what they're going to do and what their position is. And in all likeli-
hood, in my view, their position and their attitude will change on a
daily basis.
MR. SHARP: Some of the things I've seen are companies that are
owned by a hedge fund that had counted on and depended upon that
hedge fund for a continuing source of either growth or working capi-
tal; suddenly, that source of growth and working capital is gone. You
now have a lender who is now incapable of lending you more money
and in fact, they're now in a push to say, "All right, we want you to
start paying something back," and that makes it a distressed situation,
that makes it ten times worse. And they have something of a strong
position: "Look, if you can't pay us back our loan, we're going to liq-
uidate because we need the cash. It's only $0.50, but it's better than
what we have right now."
MS. MAYERSON: So would you predict that even healthy compa-
nies might be affected by the problems of the hedge funds because if
they have - the hedge fund has a significant investment, how is that
going to affect a healthy company?
MR. SHARP: I will take a drastic position and I'll let Jeff disagree
with me. I don't think there is a healthy company that has a hedge
fund as a component of its financial structure.
MR. MARWIL: I have no idea.
MR. SHARP: So I think it's going to -
MS. MAYERSON: A better off company.
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MR. SHARP: However distressed or not distressed it is, it's going
to make it worse, because any time your capital structure is stressed,
all things will flow downhill, and you will be stressed. As Jeff and I
were talking about earlier, this is the first time in my career that the
lender sitting across the table is as scared as the debtor. And while I
enjoy a good economic downturn as much as the next guy, this one
makes my palms sweat because I don't like it when the bank sitting
across the table from me is more scared than my client. That makes
me nervous.
MR. MARWIL: And some of the dynamics in dealing with the
traditional lenders-they don't necessarily want to write down their
loan. In fact, they don't want to write down the loan at all if they
don't have to. They certainly don't want to get collateral back. They
don't want to be an owner of a business, and they don't want to suffer
the adverse consequences of liquidation on their balance sheet.
And so a lot of these banks are saying, "Listen, I'm going to let you
live, and I'm not going to play hardball like I might have in the last
downturn or during the last business cycle. I'm going to let you live
because the alternative for me is much worse. I might die as a result,
in particular, if I do this across the board in my portfolio." So the
borrowers may have some advantage right now depending on who
their lenders are in going to the lenders and saying, "We're not going
to make any more payments, no interest, we're not going to live up to
the covenants. We just need to go into survival mode, and we're going
to operate with our cash, and we're going to hope we make it, and
when we make it out at the end of the downturn or when our industry
turns around, we'll try and sell the company, and hopefully we'll get
you paid as much as possible." Nobody else is in the money, and it's
not predictable that anybody else will be. And they go to their con-
stituents and say, "We're better off alive than dead. If you push too
hard, we're going to kill ourselves." And I think you're going to see
companies out there just operating.
MR. SHARP: I think that's right.
MS. KOPACZ: That's what we do on Monday, Wednesday and
Friday.
MR. SHARP: This is the Cleavon Little, "Don't make me shoot."
MS. MAYERSON: You know, we've talked about hedge funds
having been opportunistic investors in the distressed space. Now
they're forced to be in the distressed space. Do they have the profes-
sionals to handle that and to make rationale decisions?
MR. MARWIL: We're right here.
MR. SHARP: Let me hand out my cards.
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MS. KOPACZ: The challenge really is that so many people that are
on the inside of hedge funds - and I'm not talking about the named
people that you do see, but the people that actually run the invest-
ments, run the complicated models that match the portfolios and look
at them everyday - have never been in a downturn. They've never
been in a business cycle where credit wasn't available. So the chal-
lenge is that yeah, obviously they need some professional advice, and
we're not saying we've got the answers. As I said before, every re-
structuring that all of us have been in has always been different and
that's why it's so exciting to be in our business because you get to
learn all the time and you just kind of rely on what you know. But the
people inside of hedge funds, they don't know what they don't know
right now. And that's the challenge.
MR. SHARP: We're seeing the same situation with lenders. You
have lenders out there who have never been through the cycle who
don't know - I'm saying they don't know what they're doing is
maybe strong, but they really don't know what they're doing.
So these are the bright, young people, and they are very smart, and
the MBAs that went to the hedge funds because they were making a
ton of money at the two and twenty, and they were making a ton of
money based on their certain business model and decisions they made,
which created a lot of money for them. Those same decisions, that
same matrix doesn't work anymore, and they've never been in a situa-
tion where that doesn't work anymore, and it will be fun.
MS. MAYERSON: Let's talk a little bit more about the portfolio
companies. We've talked a lot about the hedge fund, but how do you
think the companies should react now that their source of capital has
dried up? We've talked about how little capital there is out there.
What are some strategies for the company, the portfolio company, and
how is that changing?
MR. SHARP: Dial a prayer.
MR. MARWIL: Communication is one of the keys. Communica-
tion and planning. Given our prior comments about the lack of acces-
sibility to Debtor In Possession financing in the event a bankruptcy is
needed, management really needs to focus on future cash flows and
making predictions that are maybe not necessarily so rosy about those
future cash flows to see if there's a possibility that it's going to wake
up one day and it won't be able to make payroll, if it's going to hit the
wall, a cash flow wall. And management really needs the crystal ball in
certain respects, but it needs a pessimistic view in order to avoid what
would then be probably certain liquidation. If a company gets so close
that it needs additional liquidity in order to keep its doors open, and
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there is no additional liquidity and the lenders and others in the capi-
tal structure don't have the ability to provide that liquidity, not that
they don't want to or that they're being levered into it and don't like
it, but they literally can't provide it, it's incumbent on management
and the Board of Directors and their advisors to try to prevent that
day from happening. And the only way to do that is you need the
luxury of time, and you need to be looking into the future, and you
need to be making decisions and entrenchments in order to make sure
you avoid that.
And I know to some of you that probably sounds like, "Well, how is
this country ever going to get out of the decline that we're in? How
are we going to get back to growth if companies are constantly cutting
expenses, if they're pulling back, if they're not making investments, if
they're not spending money?" I don't know the answer to that, but I
do know that, for companies that are on the edge or close to the edge
and even for companies that aren't that close to the edge, you've got
to have that kind of contingency plan. The other thing is there are a
lot of managers out there who have never been through a situation
where their balance sheet or their industry is distressed, and they
don't know how to manage in a time of, where they need the disci-
pline. And there are bank groups out there and lenders out there and
investors out there who will exact that discipline on management, and
management should welcome it.
And like Brad said when I had lunch with him, he said, "Sometimes
you've got to whack the management with a two-by-four and if you hit
them enough times, they'll ultimately get the fact that they need to be
reporting, they need to be planning and need to be moving forward,
and they need to be thinking about the future without the rose-
colored glasses."
So that kind of planning and communicating with your lenders and
your investors and your constituents, your employees, your customers,
your vendors, talking to people about the business and setting expec-
tations, I think, are all part of the formula, and that includes, you
know, talking to your hedge fund investors and maybe even still being
out there looking to see if you can find some new money or find more
friendly investors who may be willing to come in and buy out the in-
vestors who really need to be bought out.
MR. SHARP: All of the management practices that companies
used to thrive during this last business cycle, those no longer work.
And hopefully the management team has seen that whatever they've
learned to do to thrive, they have to change because before, if you
needed more capital, you went out and got it. You didn't really have
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to focus on the checkbook accounting, bringing in more cash than
you're spending. Now you do. And those that will survive are those
that can make that adjustment.
MS. KOPACZ: The point Brad makes is really important; it is that
an awful lot of people that sit inside corporate controller or treasury
functions inside of businesses do not know how to manage for cash.
And that is-it's a skill that- you know, what we try to do in restruc-
turing is give people some optionality, and when you're walking down
a road and you think that you're going to hit something, what we try
to do is stretch that road out so that you could figure out how to turn.
And the only way you do that is through liquidity and cash manage-
ment, and that's a skill set that many, many, most managers today,
even you know, sophisticated finance departments don't have and it is
and it was, what we're seeing is that you have to, they never had to
solve a problem. In the last ten years, for the most part, businesses
didn't have to actually solve a problem. They simply raised more
money. And that's now what we're seeing, it's not, I heard the CEO
or COO of General Growth today basically say he's just got a balance
sheet problem. Just a balance sheet problem.
AUDIENCE: I have a question. You've been talking about recog-
nizing a problem, and we do a lot of debtor work too, and my problem
is getting the CEOs and the CFOs to recognize the problem and ac-
cept the problem, and they're always fighting with you. "Well, you
can't tell this group. I've got to make a special deal with this group."
How do you solve that problem, which is a basic problem you have in
representing a debtor?
MR. MARWIL: That's the age-old question. It's "denial is not a
river in Egypt." It is a problem, and sometimes it takes a discussion
with the Board of Directors and convincing the Board that they've got
an obligation to consider alternatives and to weigh the risks and bene-
fits and the likelihood of success and the various alternatives and to
tell them that they need to plan for the contingencies. And it's access
to the Board sometimes that's hard to get, and sometimes your Board
is your management.
MR. SHARP: I had a conversation with a CEO, and I said at the
end of the day, "I have an office to go back to. You won't." And
thirty days later, he was gone, and I was still there. You try, somebody
asked me what's the hardest part of my job and the hardest part of my
job is convincing them they have a problem. Once you get there,
you're eighty percent there. But you have to hit them with a two-by-
four sometimes, and sometimes they don't get it, and our saying in the
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firm is "If you're dumped, you suffer." And that's what's going to
happen to them.
MS. MAYERSON: I have found that sometimes the problem is
even convincing my partners. Something will show up on my radar
screen, I'll go to my partner whose corporate client it is and say, "I'd
like to make a presentation to your client." "I'm not mentioning insol-
vency to my client. I can't introduce you."
So it really sometimes takes creativity. But I find that usually if you
convince them that there will be no equity left in a middle market or a
small company if they continue on the road they're on, somehow eq-
uity perks up their ears and you can get them to at least start listening,
but it is really hitting them over the head.
MS. KOPACZ: It is, and one of the things this is - again we use
the word creativity, but it's also just, you know, sometimes a little un-
derhanded, if you've got a poster child that is in deep, deep do-do
that's in their industry that's a competitor, sometimes we can get them
to move in the right direction just so they don't end up like X.
I do a lot of work in retail and, you know, I love the Steve & Barry
story. Let's not go down that path. And again, whatever you can do,
whatever you can do, form some, it's the solvency speech, scare them,
hit them over the head, lie to them.
MS. MAYERSON: Don't go that far.
MS. KOPACZ: But try to - try any method you can because, quite
frankly, what does happen is you wake up and you put off the deci-
sion, you put off the decision, and all of a sudden a week from Thurs-
day, you're out of cash, and then you have no options.
MS. MAYERSON: I know that Jeff has predicted that this is going
to be an utterly chaotic period, but I want to put forth a different
scenario and get your reactions based on some of the things that have
been said. As Marti said, private equity doesn't really get bankruptcy,
but they're going to have to because they're going to be investing
more and more in it, so we have to think that maybe they'll start get-
ting people on board who have these skills. We've talked about the
fact that every fund has a different strategy. So you normally don't
know what that strategy is, which makes it kind of hard to appeal to
them. And this unpredictability, of how they'll react, has made it hard
to reorganize.
But the fact of the matter is, if all these funds are struggling the way
Jeff has described, then it becomes pretty predictable again because
they're all facing the same kind of liquidity issues and trying to get out
of it. Then we've also talked about the fact that they may let compa-
nies live because they have no choice. So my question is, with all
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these factors coming together, could it lead at the end of this cycle to
more predictability when we have funds having more experience in
bankruptcy, we have more of a sameness of goals, might we get to
more predictability that would facilitate reorganization instead of situ-
ation we're emerging from where funds being involved has not helped
reorganization?
MR. SHARP: I do think we will get to more stability, but the ques-
tion is, you know, after the last shoe has dropped, and I think we're
still - the closet is still falling. The auto industry hasn't even started
yet.
MS. KOPACZ: You're looking at us crazy. The restructuring in the
auto industry hasn't started. Go ahead.
MR. SHARP: We've seen drips out of the pipe, but the pipe has
not burst. It's going to. And so until the shoes stop dropping, we're
not going to see stability. The bright light I see out there, and there is
one, is that look at the business leaders that are getting trained right
now. These young people that we talked about that don't have any
experience are getting a hell of a lot right now. And twenty years
from now, these are going to be the people who are going to be sitting
up at the panel talking to young people and saying, "Let me tell you
about what happened in 2009."
MS. KOPACZ: We're going to have to hit bottom.
AUDIENCE: We are a capitalist society.
MS. KOPACZ: When you start, I read Business Week only for
chuckles and laughs in that commentary thing in the front end. The
idea that we're turning around in the second half of this year, go fig-
ure. Not happening. And I think until the greater populous - and I
don't want to be a Chicken Little here, but until the greater populous,
until the pundits, until the economists and the politicians accept that
we still have either a ways to drop or a period of time in which we're
going to sit at this level until we can get all of these massive, massive
problems sorted out, we're going to continue to deal with the denial
and the fact that the sun's coming up tomorrow.
AUDIENCE: Increasing taxes isn't going to help the situation.
AUDIENCE: We've been discussing the legal issues, but what
about accounting issues? The Chairman of FASB 6, of course, has been
grilled in Congress, and I was wondering if you have some issues that
you can raise with what accounting changes should be made or have
been made in the past and what should be made in the future.
6. Financial accounting standards board.
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MS. KOPACZ: I was thrilled with the relaxation of mark to market.
The question was, what about changes in accounting, and how can
that, I think, help or not help the situation. And I personally was
really happy with the relaxation on the mark to market rules and reg-
ulations. I'm not sure what the right answer is, but I know and we're
going to - Sandy has a question a little bit later about some of the
proposed solutions that are coming out of Washington, and right now
you can't value anything. You cannot value anything right now.
MR. SHARP: Jeff and I were talking earlier. It used to be that
values were based on, "What's the cash flow generated by that asset,
what is the underpinning value of that company?" We got past that,
and we got to the value, which is what somebody's going to pay for it
in the market, and somebody's going to pay for it in the market be-
cause there's a lot of money chasing it. So the value got disconnected
from the underlying cash flow generation of the asset. And people
started making bets on where the price was going to go, and it was
price and not value. And with the mark to market that goes the same
way, it goes up and then it goes down. When there's no market,
there's no price. So I think the accounting rules need to get back to,
"what is the underlying cash flow generated by the asset," and that's
what the value needs to be.
I share the view that this mark to market was silly. Just the same as
when you have a corporation that is focused on its quarterly dividend.
What's the quarterly dividend going to be, what's the quarterly stock
price? We must show a consistent growth, regardless of what it does to
overall long-term decisions for the business. It's the same bad result.
And when you have a hedge fund that is focused on showing quarterly
increase in asset value, they start making bad decisions. Yes, we
should write this asset down, but that will show us a reduction in the
net asset value, so let's forget about that; let's show it at a higher value
even though it's not a reflection of reality. Accounting rules need to
get back to reality. And we haven't been there for ten years.
MS. MAYERSON: One of the changes that I think is very benefi-
cial is in the economic stimulus package 7; they provided that cancella-
tion of indebtedness income can be spread out - the recognition of it
can be spread out over four or five years, but they only gave a very
small window where that benefit is going to exist, and consistent with
what Marti said, I think the legislators have to start realizing we're in
this for the long haul and things like that are helpful and need to be
extended for a longer period of time. Also piggybacking on your ques-
7. Pub. L. No 111-5 (Feb. 17, 2009).
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tion, in our materials, you'll see towards the end of the materials that
we talk about some legislation that has been proposed to make hedge
funds more transparent and more accountable. As Marti said, one of
the benefits - one of the things that have allowed hedge funds and
private equity to operate as they have is that they're very lightly regu-
lated. So do you think these proposals to make hedge funds and pri-
vate equity more transparent is going to be a good thing or bad thing
as far as reorganization is concerned?
MR. SHARP: One of my colleagues is a dyed in the wool, buyer
beware; investors know what they're buying into when they're buying
into a hedge fund, and if they're dumb enough to not ask for the
things they want, they're dumb enough to live with the consequences.
I'm not quite that far. I think transparency is important because if you
have multiple investors that don't like the way things are going, they
can contact each other and drive change. So I think - I'm in favor of
transparency. I'm in favor of consistent accounting policy and report-
ing. And then after that, with full and adequate information, the in-
vestor gets what they get.
MR. MARWIL: We used to have a seller's market. The manage-
ment companies and the geniuses that formed these hedge funds, they
could put out any terms that they wanted and basically put together
what their strategy was and contract capital and make a fortune, and
the investors, if they wanted to invest. And I think this even goes to
Allen's questions about Madoff; he created a mystique. And a lot of
these managers create mystiques about themselves and about their
funds and about the returns they've been able to generate such that,
you know, they don't need your money and if you want to invest,
you've got to invest on their terms, and you'll get whatever informa-
tion the manager wants to give you regardless of what the documents
say, and those are the rules. That's all changed, and I think now peo-
ple are going to be very careful about what they invest in, and they're
going to be careful about making sure that they have real rights, real
rights to transparency and rights to some level of control or taking
control at least away from a fund manager who may be on the line or
across the line in terms of fiduciary duties.
So I think there is going to be a change. There are plenty of healthy
hedge funds that are still out there, probably more that are healthy
than that are not, but there are so many. I think there are something
like, Marti said, 9,000 hedge funds. Thousands of them are in the pro-
cess of failing and winding up. And no matter what, that's a lot of -
there's a lot of capital that's associated with that, and that, I think, is
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going to change the dynamic of the investor and the agenda of the
investor going forward.
MR. SHARP: But the one thing I think - and Jeff, you can correct
me if I'm wrong - the investors in these hedge funds are not necessa-
rily widows and orphans.
MR. MARWIL: A lot of them are fund to fund. A lot of these
funds invest in other funds, and if you boiled it all down, you don't
know -
MR. SHARP: You have three people in New Jersey who are actu-
ally investing in this.
MS. KOPACZ: Understand a lot of what went on during - in the
last few years was funds making money off of other funds. It's that -
kind of that musical chairs game that children play in terms of by the
way people made money was through the increase in the velocity of
the money, not in making profits out of the business. So you necessa-
rily, when the music stops or when that chair gets pulled out, you're
necessarily going to have a contraction in capital, and I think that's
going to be permanent.
AUDIENCE: You haven't talked about, or you have indirectly, the
government involvement, and I wrote myself about re-establishing the
market equilibrium, because that's what we're talking about, the
peaks and valleys of the business cycles and the other vagaries trans-
posed and then trying to make money during those periods. So a
good question is whether we should let the market work and not im-
pose more regulation and more, more regulation I guess.
MR. SHARP: I'll start. I think we as a society have two choices.
Try to shallow out the drop and run the risk of making the pain last
longer or let the drop just fall and make it last less time. This is: do
you yank the Band-Aid off fast or slow? My response is yes, you need
to do a little bit of both. I think you do need to try to address some of
the systemic issues, but I think they resolve around what some of the
questions said: what are the accounting rules? Make sure that the in-
formation is out there for the investors to make an informed decision,
and let the market happen the way the market should happen. That's
my view.
MS. MAYERSON: We're getting close to the end, and before we
do, I think we should talk about the fact that we are all aware that the
Obama administration is floating various proposals to have hedge
funds and private equity buy up the bad assets of financial institutions
as part of their, they will give incentives to hedge funds and private
equity to buy the bad assets so that the financial institutions can clean
up their balance sheets. Marti, do you think that hedge funds and
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private equity will have an appetite for that in this current
environment?
MS. KOPACZ: I don't know whether or not they're going to have
an appetite, but I think if they buy the bad assets, it's a really scary
proposition. Let's think about it first in the context of a hedge fund.
Hedge funds are traders.
MR. SHARP: Traitors.
MS. KOPACZ: That's right. They're traders, okay. These toxic as-
sets, think about it, it's consumer debt. It's household mortgages. It's
corporate loans to businesses that as we said don't have any more
capacity to do anything. Hedge funds don't manage businesses, not
very well. They also aren't set up. Where do you get the systems to
manage these assets? They don't have that. Now think about private
equity. Private equity, again private equity may be a little better situ-
ated in terms of managing a loan, if you will, to a corporation in the
sense that there's a fundamental understanding of that business. But
at the end of the day, what - I don't know what we're thinking.
None of these organizations - I mean even the biggest hedge funds in
the world don't have 200 employees. How are they going to manage
billions and billions of dollars?
AUDIENCE: It's a Ponzi scheme again.
MS. KOPACZ: So I think, you know, the rate of return, think back.
Those of us who were around with the RTC 8 and the FDIC9 and all
those assets, okay, I mean there are people who made a lot of money
on those assets. So history will tell us that the rate of return is there,
which should be appealing to people who want to make the invest-
ment and want to make that return. But to put it into the hands of the
hedge fund guys or the private equity guys, I think, is really quite
foolhardy.
MR. MARWIL: A couple of other things. The offer by the adminis-
tration to the hedge funds is limited. I think there's a requirement of
size and there are only a couple of hedge funds in the country that are
big enough and that will qualify. Secondly, why would any smart indi-
vidual at this point, seeing how the government has flip flopped and
imposed itself on the organizations in which it's made its investments
and provided the relief, why would they invite the government if they
don't need it? If they make the investment, is the government going
to come in and limit how much an investment manager or portfolio
manager or the hedge fund manager can make? I don't think any of
8. Resolution trust corporation.
9. Federal deposit insurance corporation.
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those guys are going to take that risk. So I personally just don't think
that this proposal is going to be successful.
MR. SHARP: And my view is that I don't think this proposal is
necessary. I think, as Marti said, the yield is out there. We played this
game before in the RTC days, and a lot of people made a lot of
money. I think I've already seen in cases I'm dealing with that there's
money out there that's chasing these assets. It's going to continue to
chase these assets. If it's the right deal at the right price, people are
going to buy it without government assistance because, I agree with
Jeff, they don't want the government mucking around in their busi-
ness, and I think that's going to be out there. This is the classic greed
and fear. Greed was so strong for so long that people forgot the fear.
They forgot that risk goes with reward. Well, now the fear is outlasting
greed, and that will continue for a while until people get greedy again,
which we all know they will because we all depend upon that. And at
some point, the greed will overwhelm the fear, and people start buy-
ing the stuff at a discount and make a lot of money, and that's the way
it should work.
MS. MAYERSON: Someone asked me why I became a bankruptcy
lawyer, and I said, "Well, because as long as there's greed, I'll always
have business." So I understand what you're saying. I think we're
getting to the close of our time, and before we end, I would like each
panelist to take a couple minutes and tell you one point they want you
to leave with today. So if you can only go away with one thing on
your mind, Jeff, what do you think it should be?
MR. MARWIL: No two hedge funds are the same, and no two
hedge funds are going to have the exact same objectives and agenda.
And in dealing with them and dealing with your clients and the situa-
tions that you face, getting information and trying to understand
what's driving the hedge fund and what's driving its business agenda, I
think, is important, but more important than that is dealing with all of
the constituents that you have in your capital structure and keeping
your eye on the ball down the road so that you don't end up in that
situation where you've hit the wall and you've got no liquidity and
you're forced to liquidate.
MS. MAYERSON: Marti?
MS. KOPACZ: I think whether you're involved representing the
investors, lenders, equity holders or whether you're representing the
companies or the individuals, I think, right now, time is not your
friend. The best decisions should be made sooner rather than later,
and there will be more options available for success today than I think
there will be six months or nine months down the road.
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MR. SHARP: I guess I'll say focus on value. Focus on the value of
the enterprise you're dealing with and drive the bus. And there is so
much uncertainty right now that if you focus on the values that are
there and push hard and make everybody try to react to you, you will
stand a much better chance of getting through alive because a lot of
them have so much else on their plate that it's easier for them to react
than for them to make their own decisions.
MS. MAYERSON: For myself, I would just say I'm a true believer
in the reorganization process, and at the start of my career, we did
reorganizations routinely and saved jobs and saved businesses and
that felt really good. But it's been a long time since we've been able
to do much beyond a 363 sale. 10 And I do think that the only good
news today is that as these hedge funds and private equity get more
experience in bankruptcy and reorganizations, because they're going
to have to get more experience in bankruptcy and reorganization, I
think over time we will be able to start doing reorganizations again,
and I think in the long term, that will be good for the economy.
AUDIENCE: I think I can speak loud enough. How long do you
think it will be before a state has to reorganize?
MR. SHARP: I'm from California. What time is it?
AUDIENCE: There are lots of them on the line right now and the
first one's that's going to cross I would say -
MS. KOPACZ: Michigan.
AUDIENCE: I think, in two to five years, you'll have a state that
will be forced to reorganize, and that's even optimistic.
MR. SHARP: If it's going to happen, it will happen in less than two
years.
MS. KOPACZ: I agree with that.
MS. MAYERSON: Any more questions? I want to thank you all
for your attention. You're a fabulous audience. Thank you so much.
10. 11 USC §363.
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